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The dominant modeling approach in macroeconomics so 
far has been to assume that markets in an economy are 
complete and frictionless. Economists using this approach 
have assumed, in other words, that in the economy they 
are studying, markets exist for all possible trades that any 
individual might want to make, at any date and under any 
possible contingency, and that these markets operate with-
out any frictions; individuals can buy and sell as much as 
they want in any market at given prices—without any 
constraints on borrowing in credit markets, for example, 
or on short sales in asset markets—and without any trans-
action costs.
1 
While admittedly quite inconsistent with the character-
istics of actual economies, this modeling approach has 
been the best macroeconomists have been able to use, and 
the approach has generally worked pretty well. Yet some 
puzzles it has simply not been able to solve. Apparently, 
for some issues, the incompleteness and frictions in actual 
economies are crucial. So another modeling approach, one 
that incorporates these characteristics, is necessary—and 
thanks to recent computational advances, some progress 
has been made in developing such an approach. 
To promote more progress, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis last year sponsored a conference which 
brought together much of the significant recent work of 
this type. The particular form of market incomplete-
ness/frictions focused on at the conference is the absence 
of insurance markets in which individual-specific risks 
may be insured against. In this paper, I explain in detail 
why this modeling approach can be expected to have a 
significant impact on answers to questions of interest to 
macroeconomists and national policymakers. I provide 
some specific examples of topics in which this research 
has been or promises to be especially useful. I describe 
the contributions made by the papers presented at the Min-
neapolis Fed's conference. And I describe what I see as 
the most fruitful directions for future research of this type. 
The Focus 
The reason for focusing on insurance markets is that, when 
compared with the standard approach, models with incom-
pleteness and frictions in these markets are likely to have 
significantly different and empirically plausible implica-
tions for a variety of issues of interest to macroeconomists 
and policymakers. 
The new modeling approach incorporates the empir-
ically plausible notion that individuals face substantially 
greater uncertainty at the individual level than that repre-
!It is not straightforward to distinguish between market incompleteness and fric-
tions, as this description implicitly suggests. Sufficiently high costs of transacting in a 
particular market might lead to the market being inactive and, hence, effectively, ab-
sent. Market incompleteness and frictions might also arise from informational problems. 
For instance, if individual incomes are private information and, hence, unverifiable, 
then it may be impossible to provide any insurance against the risks that individuals 
face. If there are adverse selection problems (different groups of individuals have dif-
ferent risk characteristics which are private information), then some groups may be 
prevented from buying as much insurance as they would like. 
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sented by fluctuations in aggregate variables like per cap-
ita consumption or per capita income—the types of fluctu-
ations incorporated by standard models. Per capita con-
sumption is notoriously smooth (fluctuating on average 
less than 1 percent from trend), and per capita income is 
only somewhat more variable (fluctuating on average less 
than 2 percent from trend). In contrast, individual earnings 
can fluctuate on average as much as 25 percent from 
trend. Presumably, the reason for the substantially greater 
uncertainty at the individual level is the inability to fully 
insure against individual-specific risks. For otherwise in-
dividuals would face no more uncertainty than that repre-
sented by fluctuations in per capita consumption or per 
capita income. In turn, the substantial uncertainty faced by 
individuals must have important implications for consump-
tion, saving, asset accumulation, and portfolio behavior. 
In addition to this substantially greater uncertainty faced 
by individuals, the new modeling approach includes mar-
ket frictions like borrowing and short-sale constraints and 
transaction costs. These seem ubiquitous features of ob-
served markets which make individuals' budget constraints 
quite different from what they would be otherwise. Gen-
erally speaking, such frictions can introduce kinks, non-
linearities, and even nonconvexities into individuals' bud-
get constraints. 
Some Sample Topics 
Thus, the combination of incomplete insurance markets 
and frictions is likely to lead to significantly different pos-
itive and normative implications than the implications of 
standard models with complete and frictionless markets. 
I will illustrate this by giving some examples of issues of 
interest to macroeconomists and policymakers. 
Consumption and Saving 
The behavior of individual as well as aggregate consump-
tion and saving has been an important research topic for 
macroeconomists. With complete insurance markets, indi-
viduals can fully insure idiosyncratic variations in their 
earnings. Therefore, individual consumptions will not re-
spond to individual-specific shocks to earnings, but only 
to aggregate shocks which affect per capita consumption. 
In fact, individual consumptions will be perfectly corre-
lated with each other and with per capita consumption, 
and each individual's consumption will vary as much as 
anyone else's and as much as per capita consumption. 
There is a wealth of empirical evidence strongly at vari-
ance with these implications and suggesting that individ-
uals' consumption and saving behavior is strongly influ-
enced by the uncertainty they face due to the inability to 
fully insure earning fluctuations. 
Friedman's (1957) permanent income theory of con-
sumption was the first attempt to explain the dependence 
of an individual's consumption on the individual's earn-
ings when the opportunity exists to save and dissave at a 
constant interest rate. Implicit in this formulation is the 
view that this individual is part of an economy composed 
of a large number of such individuals whose earnings 
fluctuate randomly in an idiosyncratic fashion (that is, 
uncorrected across individuals) and that insurance mar-
kets in which individuals could have fully insured away 
their earning fluctuations are absent.
2 If the utility function 
is quadratic, consumption is not restricted to be nonneg-
ative, and the interest rate equals the utility discount rate 
(Sargent 1987, chap. 12), then it can be shown that con-
sumption in any period equals the consumer's permanent 
income, that is, the annuity value of the consumer's 
wealth. Therefore, consumption responds strongly to per-
manent changes in earnings and only weakly to temporary 
changes in earnings. Further, consumption responds only 
to previously unanticipated news about permanent income, 
so changes in consumption from one period to the next 
are unforecastable. 
A key feature of the permanent income theory of con-
sumption is certainty equivalence—that is, the idea that 
the consumer's behavior depends only on the conditional 
expectation of future earnings, not on any other features 
of the distribution of earnings.
3 Leland (1968), Sandmo 
2If we abstract away from aggregate shocks for now, it follows that because of the 
large number of individuals there will be no uncertainty in aggregate earnings. This jus-
tifies the assumption that the interest rate is nonstochastic since prices and interest rates 
reflect aggregate information and aggregate information is nonstochastic. The further 
assumption that the interest rate is constant over time may be justified by focusing on 
a steady state in which the distribution of assets across individuals is constant over time. 
The determination of the interest rate would be a problem requiring a general equi-
librium analysis, and this would come later. There is a considerable literature which 
applies and tests the permanent income theory of consumption to aggregate consump-
tion and earnings. In this context, the assumption that the interest rate is constant can 
only be justified by assuming that there is a storage technology which yields a constant 
return. This is not plausible. The assumption that the interest rate is independent of ag-
gregate earnings is quite a stretch and is unlikely to be a good approximation, unlike 
the assumption that the interest rate is independent of an individual's earnings. Thus, 
it is not clear whether the empirical failures of the permanent income theory of con-
sumption when tested using aggregate data really have much bearing on how good the 
theory is or simply reflect how bad the assumption is regarding the constancy of the 
interest rate or, more generally, its independence from aggregate earnings. 
3This is also known as the separation principle. The consumer's problem can be 
separated into one part which involves replacing current and future earnings by their 
conditional expectations and solving the resulting deterministic problem and another 
part which involves computing these conditional expectations given the stochastic pro-
cess of earnings. 
25 (1970), and Dreze and Modigliani (1972) were among the 
first to analyze the dependence of the individual's con-
sumption/saving choice on the riskiness in future income. 
In the context of a two-period problem, they show that 
whether the person consumes less and saves more or con-
sumes more and saves less in response to riskier future 
earnings depends on the third derivative of the utility 
function. If the third derivative is positive—that is, the 
marginal utility of consumption is convex—then an in-
crease in the riskiness of future earnings causes the con-
sumer to consume less and save more. This extra saving 
reflects the desire of consumers to protect themselves 
against low future earnings and has been termed precau-
tionary saving.
4 
Both the permanent income theory and the theory of 
precautionary saving ignore liquidity constraints by per-
mitting consumption to be negative. Yet casual evidence 
suggests that many consumers are constrained in their bor-
rowing and that this affects their consumption behavior in 
a way different from the predictions of the theories of per-
manent income or precautionary saving. If consumption 
has to be nonnegative and individuals face uncertainty in 
their future earnings (due to incomplete insurance mar-
kets), then individuals will be subject to borrowing con-
straints. This happens because, if their debt is too high, 
then there is some chance that they may have to default 
in the event that their future earnings remain unexpectedly 
low for a number of periods. Therefore, individuals will 
face binding constraints in how much they can borrow. 
The presence of borrowing constraints has a significant 
effect on individual consumption behavior. When an indi-
vidual's assets get too low and the individual cannot bor-
row, that person's consumption responds strongly to even 
temporary changes in earnings. However, when assets are 
high and the individual is a saver rather than a borrower, 
the person's consumption responds only weakly to tem-
porary changes in earnings.
5 
This kind of behavior at the individual level can have 
repercussions at the aggregate level as well. When a sig-
nificant fraction of households are close to being borrow-
ing-constrained, a bad aggregate shock can cause these 
households to cut back significantly on consumption 
spending. Consequently, under some conditions, aggregate 
consumption may respond rather strongly to certain types 
of aggregate shocks relative to the predictions of a model 
with complete insurance markets or one without borrow-
ing constraints. 
At the aggregate level, the combination of a precau-
tionary saving motive and a borrowing constraint leads to 
a higher capital stock and aggregate saving rate (Laitner 
1979, 1992; Bewley, undated).
6 It has been suggested that 
these factors may be quantitatively significant contributors 
to aggregate saving (Zeldes 1989, p. 289). Further, incom-
plete insurance market models with borrowing constraints 
can lead to a well-defined stationary distribution of wealth 
characterized by a lot of mobility of individuals across the 
wealth distribution. Thus, such models can potentially ad-
dress facts concerning the wealth distribution and mobility 
in addition to aggregate saving.
7 
Wealth Distribution 
The study of how society's wealth distribution is deter-
mined at a point in time as well as over time is a topic at 
the core of arguments concerning the trade-off between 
equity and efficiency. Empirical evidence suggests that 
incomplete insurance markets are crucial in understanding 
these issues. 
With complete insurance markets, an individual's po-
sition in society's wealth distribution does not vary much 
over time or across states of the world. With complete 
insurance markets, there would be no rags-to-riches or 
riches-to-rags stories of individual fortunes and misfor-
tunes. 
However, evidence suggests considerable mobility of 
individuals across the wealth and income distributions. 
4Caballero (1990) analyzes the implications of precautionary saving for con-
sumption in an infinite-horizon model assuming that the utility function is a negative 
exponential function; that is, U(c) = -exp(-Ac), where A is the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion. Kimball and Mankiw (1989) use a model of this type to analyze some 
issues in fiscal policy. 
5The classic analysis of consumer behavior with uncertain earnings and a borrow-
ing constraint is by Schechtman and Escudero (1977). Sibley (1975) and Miller (1976) 
extend the analysis of precautionary saving to the case with a borrowing constraint. 
They show that if the marginal utility of consumption is convex, then an increase in the 
riskiness of earnings reduces consumption and raises saving at each level of assets. The 
borrowing constraint becomes relevant if the interest rate is less than the utility discount 
rate. If the interest rate exceeds the utility discount rate, then the individual wants to be 
a lender and the borrowing constraint is irrelevant. Further, if the interest rate is neg-
ative, some limit on borrowing must be imposed; otherwise, the consumer's wealth is 
infinite, and nothing prevents the consumer from enjoying an infinite amount of con-
sumption. It turns out that general equilibrium considerations ensure that the equilibrium 
interest rate will be less than the utility discount rate, so that the borrowing constraint 
always plays a role. 
6 Aiyagari, forthcoming, contains an exposition of general equilibrium capital accu-
mulation models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints as well 
as references to related literature. It should be pointed out that once borrowing con-
straints are taken into account, the convexity of the marginal utility of consumption is 
irrelevant for generating higher aggregate saving. 
7It should be pointed out that in the permanent income and precautionary saving 
theories, which ignore borrowing constraints, the distribution of wealth becomes more 
and more unequal as time passes, and there is no well-defined stationary wealth dis-
tribution. 
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According to Avery and Kennickell (1989), 60 percent of 
U.S. households were in a different wealth decile in 1985 
than in 1982. Approximately 30 percent moved up, and 
30 percent moved down. Only people in the topmost and 
bottommost deciles were more likely to stay put than to 
move to a different decile. If insurance markets were com-
plete and had no frictions, it would be hard to explain the 
movement of large fractions of households across the 
wealth distribution over such a short period of time (sug-
gesting that the movement is not due to age and life-cycle 
related factors). Sawhill and Condon (1992, p. 3) report 
that, in the United States, in both the 1970s and 1980s, 
"some three out of five adults changed income quintiles. 
A little less than half the members of the bottom quintile 
moved up into a higher quintile, and about half the mem-
bers of the top quintile fell out of that quintile." 
With incomplete insurance markets, there is typically 
a trade-off between equity and efficiency. For instance, 
proportional taxes distort incentives but also promote eq-
uity by providing insurance. 
For normative analyses of equity/efficiency trade-offs, 
it is important to specify explicitly the information struc-
ture of an economy that precludes complete insurance and 
then see what allocations are compatible with resource 
and information constraints.
8 This is because the informa-
tion constraints have significant implications for what pol-
icies are or are not feasible. 
Green (1987) shows how to address an infinite-horizon 
problem of insurance with private information.
9 In his 
economy, there are a large number of individuals receiv-
ing idiosyncratically random endowment shocks which are 
privately observed. He characterizes the evolution of the 
distributions of wealth and consumption and shows how 
the optimal resource- and information-constrained alloca-
tion can be supported by the trading of bonds. 
Work in this area is continuing and promises to en-
hance our understanding of the dynamics of wealth dis-
tribution and the trade-off between equity and efficiency 
(Atkeson and Lucas 1992, 1993, references therein). 
Asset Markets 
Asset markets are an area where a new modeling ap-
proach has been badly needed, for it is probably fair to 
say that the attempts to understand various aspects of asset 
markets through the lens of complete and frictionless mar-
ket models have failed. 
Perhaps the most dramatic of these failures is the in-
ability to explain the observed equity premium (the excess 
average return on stocks over the return on short-term 
Treasury bills) and the risk-free rate (the average real re-
turn on short-term T-bills). The average annual real return 
on 90-day U.S. T-bills over the period 1948-78 is less 
than 1 percent. On stocks over the same period, this return 
is about 7 percent. (These data are from Labadie 1989, 
p. 289.) However, using the complete frictionless market 
approach, Mehra and Prescott (1985) find that the largest 
equity premium they can generate in a model of this Jype 
is 0.35 percent per annum; the corresponding risk-free rate 
is about 4 percent per annum. These results lead Mehra 
and Prescott (1985, p. 145) to conclude that the observed 
returns cannot be "accounted for by models that abstract 
from transactions costs, liquidity constraints and other fric-
tions absent in the Arrow-Debreu set-up" (by which they 
mean the standard approach). 
Recent work with models of incomplete insurance mar-
kets, borrowing and short-sale constraints, and transaction 
costs has been promising on this front. (See, for example, 
Aiyagari and Gertler 1991, Heaton and Lucas 1993.) Be-
cause of the precautionary demand for assets in such mod-
els coupled with borrowing constraints, the risk-free rate 
will be lower in them than in complete frictionless market 
models. Transaction costs in trading in equity markets can 
generate a transaction/liquidity premium on stocks relative 
to T-bills. 
Incomplete insurance market models with transaction 
costs are also potentially capable of explaining other fea-
tures of asset markets that are anomalies in the context of 
complete insurance market models. For instance, in the 
standard type of models, there is no role for asset trading, 
and the models make no predictions regarding transaction 
volumes and transaction velocities of different assets. This 
is clearly at odds with the large volume of transactions 
that take place daily in asset markets and with the pattern 
of transaction velocities and returns across assets with 
low-yielding, liquid assets having higher transaction veloc-
ities than higher yielding, less-liquid assets. Addressing 
these facts is particularly relevant for understanding the 
desirability of policies which attempt to reduce the volatil-
ity of asset markets by taxing asset market transactions, 
for example. 
8 In many incomplete insurance market models, insurance markets are simply ruled 
out by fiat. No economic reason is given for why they would not arise if they were not 
prohibited. 
9Townsend's (1982) analysis of multi-period contracting models with private infor-
mation is a key contribution in this area. He shows how in the presence of private infor-
mation a multi-period contract can be desirable over a sequence of one-period contracts. 
27 Incomplete insurance market models with frictions are 
also potentially capable of explaining the observed dis-
parities in portfolio compositions across individuals. With 
complete insurance markets, every individual would hold 
some amount of risky assets with favorable returns. If in-
dividuals' risk aversion coefficients were not too different, 
then all individuals would hold roughly similar portfolios. 
Both of these predictions are, of course, wildly at odds 
with the facts. 
The evidence on portfolios indicates considerable di-
versity in portfolio compositions for households with dif-
ferent wealth levels. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) present 
evidence that only about 25 percent of U.S. households 
own any stocks in spite of the fact that the expected return 
on stocks has been so much higher than the risk-free rate. 
According to evidence presented by Avery, Elliehausen, 
and Kennickell (1988), the ownership of stocks is highly 
concentrated at the top end of the wealth distribution, 
whereas the ownership of liquid assets is concentrated in 
the bottom end of the wealth distribution.
1
0
 The portfolios 
of households with low wealth contain a disproportion-
ately large share of low-return risk-free assets and a dis-
proportionately small share of high-return risky assets. The 




Such wide disparities in portfolio compositions would 
be hard to explain under complete fiictionless markets if 
individuals have roughly constant and equal relative risk-
aversion coefficients. And understanding the diversity in 
portfolio compositions is important for analyzing the dis-
tributional impact of policies which affect the relative re-
turns on different assets. 
Business Cycles 
Another area benefiting from the new modeling approach 
is business cycle analysis. The sources of business cycle 
fluctuations and the economic mechanisms by which 
shocks are propagated over time are fundamental topics in 
research on business cycles. There has been a resurgence 
of interest in this area following the work of Kydland and 
Prescott (1982). They show that a version of the represen-
tative-agent growth model (which belongs to the class of 
complete fiictionless market models) with technology 
shocks can generate fluctuations which resemble those of 
the postwar U.S. economy. Since Kydland and Prescott's 
(1982) contribution, there has been skepticism regarding 
the importance of technology shocks and the plausibility 
of the mechanism through which their model propagates 
shocks. It has been noted, for example, that the dynamics 
of output in their model closely resemble the dynamics 
postulated for the technology shocks and that the econom-
ic mechanism of the model itself appears to contribute 
very little to the propagation of the shocks (Rouwenhorst 
1991). 
Recently, there have been attempts to incorporate credit 
market frictions into business cycle models in order to 
provide an alternative propagation mechanism, in particu-
lar, to show how such frictions can lead to persistent fluc-
tuations even if the sources of the fluctuations are not per-
sistent (Williamson 1987, Bernanke and Gertler 1989). 
These analyses are based on the costly state verification 
model introduced by Townsend (1979) which considers 
an environment in which a potential insurer can only mon-
itor the state of the insuree at some cost.
1
2 
Williamson (1986) uses a model of a credit market 
with this feature to show how it could lead to borrowers 
being credit-rationed. It could happen that some borrowers 
are denied credit at the going interest rate and could not 




 Williamson (1987) embeds this framework in a dy-
namic model and shows how this feature could lead to 
business cycle fluctuations even though such fluctuations 
would not arise in the absence of this feature. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) also embed the costly 
10Avery, Elliehausen, and Kennickell (1988) say, for example, that the top 1 per-
cent of U.S. wealth holders own about 60 percent of all equity, but only about 10 per-
cent of all liquid assets. In contrast, the bottom 90 percent of households own about 53 
percent of all liquid assets and only about 9 percent of all equity. Greenwood (1983) 
presents similar evidence to the effect that the top 5 percent of U.S. wealth holders own 
about 85 percent of all corporate stocks and about 60 percent of all debt instruments 
(Table 4, p. 35, and Fig. 2, p. 34). 
1
1
 Kessler and Wolff (1991) calculate that the lowest wealth quintile's portfolio 
contains over 80 percent liquid assets (currency, demand deposits, and time deposits), 
only about 9 percent financial securities and corporate stocks, and only about 3 percent 
other real estate (not including housing) and unincorporated business. In contrast, the 
highest wealth quintile's portfolio contains only about 15 percent liquid assets, about 
22 percent financial securities and corporate stocks, and over 42 percent other real 
estate and unincorporated business (Table 6, p. 263). Similar evidence is presented by 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). 
12This feature precludes full insurance since if full insurance were to be offered, 
then the insurer would have to monitor every one of the insuree's possible states, and 
this would be costly. Under some conditions, the optimal contract has the features of 
a debt contract. Whenever the insuree declares a realization lower than some cutoff 
level, the insuree is monitored and the insurer takes everything. The cutoff level may 
be thought of as a promised payment, and the declaration of a lower realization may 
be interpreted as default or bankruptcy on the part of the insuree. Whenever the insuree 
declares a realization higher than the cutoff level, the insuree is not monitored and 
makes a fixed payment to the insurer. Gale and Hellwig (1985) adapt the costly state 
verification model to analyze credit contracts. 
13The reason is that a borrower who offers to pay a higher rate is one who will 
likely default more often without close monitoring, and this leads to higher monitoring 
costs to the lender and, thereby, a lower return net of monitoring costs to the lender. 
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state verification framework in a dynamic model to show 
how this feature can lead to business cycle fluctuations 
which are persistent. Their emphasis is on the net worth 
of borrowers/investors. A good shock to aggregate output 
raises borrower net worth, lowers lender monitoring costs, 
and thereby increases the quantity of loans and invest-
ment. This raises future output and, thereby, the net worth 
of future borrowers/investors and thus generates a persis-
tent increase in output. 
The nonrobustness of the implications of representa-
tive-agent models of business cycles and the small costs 
of business cycle fluctuations implied by these models 
have been troublesome. For example, very small costs of 
adjusting the capital stock from one period to the next in 
some versions of these models can lead to drastically 
different implications for the relative volatilities of con-
sumption and investment (Cochrane 1989). Further, typ-
ically these models imply very small costs of business 
cycle fluctuations and, hence, very small potential benefits 
from policies eliminating business cycle fluctuations (Lucas 
1987). 
However, with incomplete insurance markets, the busi-
ness cycle implications are likely to be more robust to 
small costs of adjusting the capital stock since the total 
uncertainty faced by individuals is substantially greater. 
For exactly the same reason, the welfare costs imposed by 
the additional uncertainty due to aggregate shocks is likely 
to be larger than when there are complete insurance mar-
kets and individuals face only aggregate uncertainty, but 
no individual uncertainty (Imrohoroglu 1989). It follows 
that the potential gains to smoothing aggregate fluctuations 
is also larger. 
Fiscal Policies 
The implications for government fiscal policies are quite 
different in models with incomplete insurance markets and 
borrowing constraints than in the standard models. 
In the new models, even when interest on government 
debt is financed by lump-sum taxes, the level of govern-
ment debt need not be neutral with respect to consump-
tion, investment, and welfare. Government debt serves a 
liquidity purpose, and an increase in government debt, in 
effect, loosens the borrowing constraint on individuals and 
can improve welfare. Permanent increases in the level of 
government debt raise the real interest rate, crowd out pri-
vate capital, and reduce private consumption. Permanent 
increases in government consumption affect not only pri-
vate consumption, but also investment and the real interest 
rate. 
These results stand in contrast to those in the standard 
representative-agent growth model with lump-sum taxes 
in which government debt is completely neutral and per-
manent changes in government consumption (with inelas-
tic labor supply) reduce private consumption one-for-one 
and have no effect on investment or the real interest rate. 
Another implication of incomplete insurance markets 
and borrowing constraints for fiscal policy is the general 
desirability of taxing capital income even in the long run 
as part of an optimal tax program (Aiyagari 1994). This 
is quite unlike models with complete and frictionless mar-
kets in which it is generally undesirable to tax capital 
income in the long run (Chamley 1986). Using a standard 
model, Lucas (1990b) argues that the welfare gains of 
eliminating the capital income tax in the U.S. economy 
are quite large. The results on optimal fiscal policy for 
models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing 
constraints cast doubt on whether such gains exist. 
Furthermore, in some versions of models in which the 
growth rate of the economy is endogenously determined 
(for example, Jones and Manuelli 1990), changes in gov-
ernment debt or government consumption can affect the 
growth rate of the economy when insurance markets are 
incomplete even though with complete insurance markets 
there would be no growth rate effects. Thus, the welfare 
costs of higher government debt and government con-
sumption may be significantly larger with incomplete mar-
kets than with complete markets. 
Caution 
While the above discussion might suggest a rather neg-
ative view of complete frictionless market models, that 
view should be resisted. The neoclassical representative-
agent growth model (which belongs to the class of com-
plete frictionless market models) has provided a powerful 
framework for analyzing a variety of questions about 




 It has provided many useful qualitative insights, 
and its application to business cycles, following the work 
of Kydland and Prescott (1982), has been quantitatively 
somewhat successful. Even though many economists feel 
that incomplete markets and a variety of frictions are rath-
14The representative-agent assumption is fairly innocuous. Even if there are many 
ex ante different agents, the competitive equilibrium allocation solves a social planning 
problem in which the social planner maximizes a weighted sum of the utilities (over 
individual consumption and leisure streams) of the different agents. This weighted sum 
of utilities can be used to transform the model to a representative-agent model in which 
the representative agent's preferences over aggregate consumption and leisure streams 
depend on the weights different individuals receive. 
29 er important, the representative-agent growth model con-
tinues to enjoy popularity, primarily because it is relative-
ly easy to obtain qualitative and quantitative predictions 
from versions of this model. When insurance markets are 
incomplete and there are some frictions, these tasks turn 
out to be far more difficult due to the analytical and com-
putational complexities of such models.
1
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 Recent advances 
in computation have, however, narrowed this edge, so that 
incomplete insurance market models with frictions can be 
investigated more fruitfully. 
The Conference Papers 
The papers presented at the Minneapolis Fed conference 
last fall cover theoretical, computational, and quantitative 
aspects of macroeconomic models with incomplete insur-
ance markets and some frictions.
1
6
 The areas of applica-
tion include all those I have described above. 
Consumption and Saving 
In my conference paper, I try to quantify the importance 
of the precautionary saving motive and borrowing con-
straints for aggregate saving. I find that moderate values 
of risk aversion, variability, and persistence in individual 
earnings generate very small increases in the aggregate 
saving rate relative to the representative-agent model— 
usually less than three percentage points. These quantita-
tive results stand in contrast to some earlier suggestions on 
the importance of precautionary saving. For example, 
Zeldes (1989, p. 289) has conjectured that "a significant 
fraction of the capital accumulation that occurs in the 
United States may be due to precautionary savings." I also 
show that in this class of models in which individuals face 
substantial uncertainty, the welfare gain to an individual 
of participating in asset markets can be quite large. This 
is in contrast to the very small welfare gains calculated by 
Cochrane (1989) in a representative-agent model. I also 
show that the model generates greater inequality in wealth 
than in income, which is consistent with the data. 
Wealth Distribution 
Phelan presents a theoretical analysis of wealth distribu-
tion when only one side to a contract can make binding 
long-term commitments—for example, firms can be legal-
ly bound by long-term promises, but workers cannot. 
The motivation here is that in the models of Green 
(1987) and Atkeson and Lucas (1992), which assume that 
everyone can make binding long-term commitments, the 
wealth and consumption distributions get more and more 
unequal as time passes. In Atkeson and Lucas' model, 
individuals receive idiosyncratic taste shocks which are 
private information. The intuitive reason for the increasing 
inequality in consumption is roughly as follows. In order 
to get someone who has a low desire for current con-
sumption to truthfully reveal that information and contrib-
ute some resources that can be used to provide extra con-
sumption to those who have a high desire for current con-
sumption, one needs to compensate the person by offering 
rewards in the future. When someone claims to have a 
high desire for current consumption, that person is given 
some extra current consumption, but in order to discour-
age false claims, future penalties are attached to such 
claims. Thus, the optimal incentive scheme tends naturally 
to generate greater and greater inequality as time passes. 
In Phelan's model, the absence of long-term commit-
ment on one side of a contract means a person can always 
walk out of that contract and be free to start a new one 
with someone else. This provides a floor below which 
people cannot be pushed and results in a nondegenerate 
wealth distribution. Thus, this paper makes a contribution 
to the theory of the dynamics of wealth distribution with 
private information. Its empirical implications are some-
what more attractive than those of some earlier theories. 
Asset Markets 
Den Haan proposes a computational algorithm for solving 
an incomplete insurance market model with aggregate 
shocks and with borrowing and short-sale constraints and 
uses it to study the quantitative significance of these fea-
tures for asset pricing. A significant contribution of this 
paper is the computational procedure itself. As was noted 
15The computational difficulties arise for the following reason. Incomplete insur-
ance markets imply ex post heterogeneity among agents; that is, even if all agents start 
out the same, they will not remain the same. Therefore, the distribution of assets among 
agents is an additional state variable for the economy, and one needs to solve for the 
equilibrium law of motion of the distribution of assets among agents simultaneously 
with solving an individual's optimization problem. Having a distribution function as 
part of the state vector complicates the computational burden enormously since a distri-
bution function is potentially an infinite-dimensional object. Further, computing the so-
lution to an individual agent's problem is significantly more difficult than computing 
the solution to a representative-agent business cycle model, for two reasons: (1) The 
extent of uncertainty faced by individuals in the incomplete insurance market models 
is much greater than that faced by the representative agent, who is only subject to ag-
gregate uncertainty. Consequently, the commonly used linear (or log-linear) approxima-
tion (to the decision rules) around the nonstochastic steady-state method for the repre-
sentative-agent model does not work very well; and (2) there is no borrowing and lend-
ing going on in a representative-agent model. Hence, there is no need to worry about 
binding borrowing constraints as there is in incomplete insurance market models. This 
imparts a high degree of nonlinearity to an agent's asset accumulation decision rule and 
is another reason why the linear (or log-linear) approximation method works poorly. 
16See the Appendix for abstracts of the papers written by the authors themselves 
and a list of the people who attended the conference. Copies of the papers are available 
from their authors. 
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previously, such models present severe computational dif-
ficulties because the distribution of wealth and portfolios 
is a state variable of the economy which evolves stochas-
tically in response to aggregate shocks. 
Business Cycles 
Krusell and Smith also propose a computational algorithm 
for solving a growth model with incomplete insurance 
markets, aggregate shocks, and a variety of frictions. In 
addition to making a contribution toward computational 
techniques for such models, the authors use the model to 
analyze the robustness of the model's aggregate time se-
ries implications to small changes in the modeling envi-
ronment. This issue is motivated by the analysis of 
Cochrane (1989) referred to earlier, which suggests that 
the aggregate time series implications of representative-
agent models are quite nonrobust to the introduction of 
small costs of, say, adjusting the capital stock. Since the 
welfare gains from optimally accumulating and decumu-
lating capital as opposed to holding a fixed amount of 
capital at all times are small, it follows that a small fixed 
cost of adjusting the capital stock would lead the represen-
tative agent to keep the amount fixed. This leads to a 
drastically different implication for the relative volatilities 
of consumption and investment. In contrast, Krusell and 
Smith find that the aggregate time series implications of 
their model are much more robust to introducing small 
fixed costs of changing behavior. 
Kiyotaki and Moore present a theoretical analysis of 
how large and persistent cyclical fluctuations can arise 
when borrowers are limited in how much they can borrow 
by the value of their collateral assets. This paper makes an 
important and novel contribution to the problem of why 
business cycle fluctuations are so persistent. It shows that 
the dynamics induced by the interdependence between 
collateral values and investment naturally generate persis-
tent cyclical fluctuations. 
Caballero and Engel attempt to reconcile the lumpy and 
intermittent behavior of investment at the firm level with 
the smoother behavior of investment at the industry level, 
thereby providing an improved explanation of investment 
dynamics at the industry level. Firms receive idiosyncra-
tically random and uninsurable investment opportunities 
and face nonconvex costs of adjusting their capital stock. 
The optimal investment policy for the firm is of the (S,s) 
type; that is, the firm lets its capital run down to the level 
5, at which time the firm undertakes investment designed 
to bring its capital stock up to the level S. Caballero and 
Engel generalize this policy by allowing the trigger levels 
(S,s) to vary randomly across firms and randomly over 
time for a firm. This generalization captures the realistic 
and empirically important features that firms do not al-
ways wait for the same stock disequilibrium to adjust and 
adjustments are not always of the same size. 
Fiscal Policies 
Krusell and Rios-Rull analyze the quantitative importance 
of taxation (motivated by redistribution) for capital accu-
mulation. In this model, individuals are heterogeneous ex 
ante, differing in initial wealth. There is a tax on savings, 
and the tax rate is determined via majority voting. The 
surprising finding of this paper is that small changes in the 
initial wealth distribution have quite large effects on long-
run output. Thus, this paper makes a contribution to the 
growing literature on political economy and shows that 
political economy considerations can be quite powerful. 
Lastly, S. Imrohoroglu analyzes the positive and nor-
mative consequences of different tax structures involving 
various combinations of labor, capital, and consumption 
taxes in a life-cycle model with incomplete insurance mar-
kets and borrowing constraints. One contribution of this 
paper is showing how to compute steady states of overlap-
ping-generations models with incomplete insurance mar-
kets and borrowing constraints. The main substantive find-
ing of this paper is that a shift away from capital income 
taxation toward labor income taxation has much smaller 
welfare gains in an incomplete market model with fric-
tions than in the representative-, infinitely lived agent 
model used by Lucas (1990b). This calls into question the 
strong quantitative support Lucas has put forward toward 
eliminating capital income taxation. 
Future Work 
There are mainly two directions in which progress needs 
to be made in the study of incomplete insurance markets 
with frictions. 
One is to improve further the computational methods 
for analyzing incomplete insurance market models which 
also contain aggregate shocks. Aggregate shocks are 
needed in these models, for example, to address questions 
about the equity premium and business cycles. The papers 
by den Haan and by Krusell and Smith are a good start, 
but have some limitations. In these papers, the distribution 
of the idiosyncratic shock is approximated by a two-state 
Markov chain, which is likely to be inadequate (Tauchen 
1986). 
31 Having more states is computationally burdensome be-
cause one needs to compute the wealth and portfolio dis-
tributions for each possible realization of the idiosyncratic 
shock. If n variables are used to describe the wealth dis-
tribution, then each additional state for the idiosyncratic 
shock contributes an additional n variables in the state 
space of the economy, which makes the state space quite 
large. 
Adding more assets also makes the computation more 
burdensome because one needs to approximate the joint 
distribution of assets for each realization of the idiosyn-
cratic shock. The number of variables needed to approxi-
mate a joint distribution of assets will likely increase faster 
than the number of assets since covariances also enter the 
joint distribution. 
Unfortunately, extending the computational methods for 
more assets is probably necessary since recent models of 
the monetary transmission mechanism have emphasized 
the uneven distribution of monetary injections across 
households and markets (Grossman and Weiss 1983, 
Rotemberg 1984, Lucas 1990a). Any model of a monetary 
economy with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks 
will involve at least two assets: money and bonds or mon-
ey and capital. A monetary model which has capital and 
hopes to address the equity premium question will neces-
sarily involve three assets. 
TTie other direction in which progress is needed is to 
extend theoretically as well as computationally the recent 
attempts to provide an information-based approach to in-
complete insurance (Green 1987, Atkeson and Lucas 
1992). This work is important for questions involving 
wealth distribution and equity/efficiency trade-offs. Fur-
ther, and as has been noted earlier, recent models of busi-
ness cycles with financial propagation mechanisms are 
based on optimal contracting in environments with private 
information (Williamson 1987, Bernanke and Gertler 
1989). 
Incomplete insurance market models with frictions have 
the potential to satisfactorily address a number of ques-
tions of interest to macroeconomists and policymakers. 
The computational and analytical difficulties involved are 
not trivial, but the payoffs are likely to be worthwhile. 
There is a great deal of difficult but exciting work ahead. 
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Appendix 
Conference Papers and Participants 
Here are summaries of the papers presented last fall at the Min-
neapolis Fed conference described in the preceding paper. These 
summaries are written by the authors of the papers.* Following 
the summaries is a list of the people who attended the con-
ference. 
The Papers 
Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving 
S. Rao Aiyagari 
Research Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
This paper studies the quantitative importance of the precaution-
ary saving motive and borrowing constraints for aggregate sav-
ing and welfare. This study is motivated by the debate concern-
ing the sources of aggregate capital accumulation, in particular, 
the suggestion that precautionary saving may be a quantitatively 
important component of aggregate saving. 
The paper uses the standard growth model of Brock and 
Mirman (1972), modified to include a role for uninsured idio-
syncratic risk and liquidity/borrowing constraints. This is done 
by having a large number of agents who receive idiosyncratic 
shocks to their individual labor productivities, which are unin-
sured, as in the models of Bewley (1986, undated). This class 
of models involves a considerable amount of individual dynam-
ics, uncertainty, and asset trading, which is the main mechanism 
(in the models) by which individuals attempt to smooth con-
sumption. However, aggregate variables are unchanging. This 
contrasts with representative-agent models in which individual 
dynamics and uncertainty coincide with aggregate dynamics and 
uncertainty. Due to the market incompleteness—that is, missing 
insurance markets—in combination with the possibility of being 
borrowing-constrained in future periods, agents accumulate ex-
cess capital in order to smooth consumption in the face of un-
certain individual labor incomes. 
The results of this paper suggest that the contribution of un-
insured idiosyncratic risk to aggregate saving is quite modest, 
at least for moderate and empirically plausible values of risk 
aversion, variability, and persistence in earnings. The aggregate 
saving rate is higher by no more than three percentage points. 
However, for sufficiently high variability and persistence in 
earnings, the aggregate saving rate could be higher by as much 
as seven or even fourteen percentage points. 
Some additional implications of the analysis are as follows. 
In contrast to representative-agent models (Cochrane 1989), it 
turns out that access to asset markets is quite important in en-
abling consumers to smooth out earnings fluctuations. In one 
example, by optimally accumulating and decumulating assets, 
an individual can cut consumption variability by about half and 
enjoy a welfare gain of about 14 percent of per capita consump-
tion or about 8 percent of per capita income, compared to a 
situation in which the individual has no access to asset markets. 
The model is also consistent, at least qualitatively, with 
certain features of income and wealth distributions. The distribu-
tions are positively skewed (median less than mean), the wealth 
distribution is much more dispersed than the income distribu-
tion, and inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is sig-
nificantly higher for wealth than for income. 
Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment 
Christopher Phelan 
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison 
Many economic relationships are characterized by differing abil-
ities of parties to commit to long-term contracts. In labor mar-
kets, while an employer could conceivably sign a contract that 
offered a worker a job for life (and face legal sanctions upon 
reneging), a worker cannot sign a contract promising to never 
quit or work for another firm. Likewise, while an insurance 
company can promise no coverage for a customer or raise pre-
miums beyond a set schedule, a customer cannot promise to 
never switch to another insurance company. In credit markets, 
banks have a much greater ability to commit to long-term credit 
arrangements with borrowers than borrowers have with banks. 
This paper considers markets where players on one side of the 
market, firms, have an unlimited ability to commit to long-term 
contracts, while players on the other side of the market, agents, 
have no ability to commit to long-term contracts. 
Models of long-term contracting given moral hazard (or 
incentive problems) have been used to create theories of the dis-
*For papers with more than one author, an asterisk indicates which author presented the paper 
at the conference. Copies of the papers are available from their authors. 
33 tribution of consumption. (See Green 1987, Phelan and Town-
send 1991, and Atkeson and Lucas 1992.) One problem with 
these earlier works is their extreme results regarding the long-
run or limiting distribution of consumption. If consumption is 
bounded, all agents eventually become as rich or as poor as pos-
sible, and if consumption is not bounded, almost all agents 
eventually are arbitrarily rich or poor. 
This paper attempts to achieve more realistic long-run results 
by modeling an individual's inability to fully commit to con-
tracts which they wish to renege on later. In this model, agents 
receive an unobserved endowment at each date which they wish 
to insure (as in Green 1987). However, this paper (unlike 
Green's) assumes that individuals can leave one insurer and 
contract with another when they find it in their interest to do so. 
This puts an endogenous lower bound on how poor an individ-
ual can get and allows for a more realistic limiting distribution 
of consumption. 
Solving Heterogeneous Agent Models: 
An Application to Asset Pricing 
With Incomplete Markets 
Wouter J. den Haan 
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, San Diego 
In several areas of economic research, it has been pointed out 
that explicit modeling of the differences between agents is cru-
cial for understanding economic phenomena. Examples can be 
found in growth theory, relating economic growth and income 
inequality; in monetary theory, using an asymmetric distribution 
of the monetary injection across the population; and in asset 
pricing, trying to explain risk premia by the lack of complete 
markets. It is also well known that combining the heterogeneity 
with a dynamic stochastic environment is a challenging prob-
lem. The intuition for the difficulty is the following. In a dy-
namic model, the optimal policy rules of the agents depend on 
the agents' state variables, which include variables that help pre-
dict future prices. Part of the set of state variables is, therefore, 
the distribution of wealth and other characteristics of the popula-
tion. Moreover, in the presence of aggregate shocks, this distri-
bution will change endogenously over time, and in general, this 
distribution cannot be restricted to belong to a specific class. 
The space of the state variables is thus much larger than in dy-
namic models using the representative-agent assumption. This 
paper extends the method of parameterized expectations to deal 
with this problem. In particular, I approximate the distribution 
by percentiles or by a set of moments. By increasing the num-
ber of included percentiles or by increasing the number of mo-
ments, the accuracy of the algorithm is increased. 
In this paper, I use the algorithm to study short-term interest 
rates in a heterogeneous-agent economy with incomplete mar-
kets. First I look at examples in which agents are ex ante iden-
tical, but different realizations of the stochastic income process 
cause the agents to be different ex post. Consequently, their ac-
cumulations of wealth and their consumption streams are dif-
ferent. Then I analyze the importance of borrowing constraints, 
the supply of government bonds, the number of agents, and the 
persistence of the stochastic shocks. I also look at examples in 
which agents are different ex ante. Examples are economies in 
which agents differ because they have different levels of risk 
aversion, face a different stochastic income process, or use dif-
ferent information sets. 
I argue that the addition of incomplete markets by itself can-
not generate substantial premiums in asset markets. I also show 
that the result found in the literature that borrowing constraints 
are effective in generating premiums disappears if there is a 
positive supply of government bonds. A promising positive re-
sult of this paper is that substantial premiums are possible in 
models in which only a small fraction of the agents face a 
(very) high variability in income. 
The Stochastic Growth Model 
With Heterogeneous Agents, 
Uninsurable Risk, Aggregate Uncertainty, 
and Fixed Costs of Flexible Behavior 
Per Krusell 
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 
and Anthony A. Smith, Jr.* 
Assistant Professor of Economics, Carnegie Mellon University 
It is often claimed that economic agents follow simple behav-
ioral rules. We hypothesize instead that agents are fully rational 
but do face costs of fully flexible behavior. We then ask how 
the introduction of such costs into the stochastic growth model 
alters the model's aggregate time series predictions. A variety 
of recent research suggests that the introduction of such costs 
can lead to dramatic changes in the dynamic behavior of the 
stochastic growth model. The purpose of this paper is to subject 
these findings to closer scrutiny by considering model econo-
mies with a richer microeconomic structure than the representa-
tive-agent, complete market models hitherto used. In particular, 
we characterize equilibria for economies where there is a multi-
tude of consumers facing both aggregate risk and substantial 
idiosyncratic, uninsurable risk. 
The specific model economy which we analyze is the stan-
dard one-sector stochastic growth model with exogenous, but 
stochastic labor supply: agents face a first-order Markov process 
for individual employment. In addition, there is an aggregate 
productivity shock, also following a first-order Markov process. 
Insurance markets are absent; the only insurance is that which 
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can be accomplished using asset accumulation. We assume that 
agents incur a resource cost for not following an inertial mle. 
Specifically, we focus on two kinds of inertial rules: one in 
which adjusting capital is costly and one in which deviating 
from a prespecified saving rate is costly. In other words, in each 
period each agent must decide whether to pay a fixed cost and 
behave in an unrestricted way or to use the simple rule at no 
cost. 
For the economy described above, the relevant aggregate 
state consists not only of the current value of the aggregate pro-
ductivity shock, but also of the entire distribution of capital 
holdings in the economy. We address this potentially large com-
putational problem by restricting individual consumers to use a 
small number of moments of the capital distribution to forecast 
the future behavior of the economy's prices. The computational 
results are striking: in all of the approximated equilibria, the 
agents in the economy are able to make close to perfect fore-
casts using a linear law of motion for the mean of the capital 
distribution. 
The substantive results of the paper are that, where idiosyn-
cratic risk plays a quantitatively important role, the introduction 
of small costs—less than 0.1 percent of consumption—of so-
phisticated behavior does not alter the model's aggregate predic-
tions by more than a small amount. The main quantitative pre-
dictions of the representative-agent model are quite similar to 
those coming out of our framework. 
Credit Cycles 
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki* 
Visitor, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
and Associate Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota 
and John Hardman Moore 
Professor of Economics, London School of Economics 
This paper is a theoretical study into how credit constraints in-
teract with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. 
In particular, for an economy where credit limits are endog-
enously determined, we investigate how relatively small, tem-
porary shocks to technology or income distribution might gen-
erate large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices. Al-
so, we ask whether sector-specific shocks can be contagious, in 
the sense that they spill over to other sectors and get amplified 
through time. 
For this purpose, we construct a model of a dynamic econ-
omy in which credit constraints arise naturally, due to the fact 
that lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless 
the debts are secured. In such an economy, fixed assets such as 
land, buildings, and machinery play a dual role: they are not 
only factors of production; they also serve as collateral for 
loans. Borrowers' credit limits are affected by the price of the 
collateralized assets. And at the same time, the price of these 
assets is affected by the size of the credit limits. The dynamic 
interaction between credit limits and asset prices turns out to be 
a powerful transmission mechanism by which the effects of 
shocks persist, amplify, and spill over to other sectors. 
Explaining Investment Dynamics 
in U.S. Manufacturing: 
A Generalized (S,s) Approach 
Ricardo J. Caballero* 
Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and Eduardo M. R. A. Engel 
Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard University 
In this paper, we derive and implement a model of aggregate 
investment that builds from the intermittent and lumpy invest-
ment behavior of firms facing nonconvexities in their adjust-
ment technology. We try to learn from aggregate empirical lags 
about the likely structure of microeconomic adjustment costs. At 
the same time, we use the underlying theory to interpret these 
lags, their instability, and their implications for standard empir-
ical investment equations. 
At the microeconomic level, models of intermittent and 
lumpy adjustment have been extensively developed within the 
(S,s) literature. Here we generalize these models so the adjust-
ment trigger barriers vary randomly across firms and for a firm 
over time. This modification introduces the realistic and empir-
ically important features that units do not always wait for the 
same stock disequilibrium to adjust and adjustments are not 
always of the same size. 
Empirical models of aggregate dynamics with heterogeneous 
microeconomic units that adjust intermittently have also been 
developed recently. Econometric implementation of these mod-
els requires observing a measure of the aggregate driving force; 
in the current context, this amounts to constructing a cost of 
capital measure. But undoubtedly many of the problems of the 
empirical investment literature are due to the difficulties of con-
structing a proper measure of the cost of capital, and even if this 
could be accomplished, such a variable is likely to be plagued 
by simultaneity and omitted variables problems. We circumvent 
these problems by proposing a nonlinear time series method that 
requires information only on the investment series itself and on 
the generating process of the driving force (but not on its real-
ization). Somewhat analogously with the standard procedure of 
estimating convex adjustment cost parameters from the first-
order serial correlation of investment, we learn about more com-
plex and realistic lumpy adjustment cost functions from the 
structure of investment lags and their changes over time. 
35 We estimate nonlinear dynamic panel data models for the 
investment/capital ratios of two-digit U.S. manufacturing indus-
tries during the period 1948-92. We find clear and widespread 
evidence in favor of our generalized (S,s) model over simple 
linear models. Our structural interpretation of this evidence sug-
gests that resizing equipment and structures has an average cost 
of 11-12 percent of the value of the old stock and that 95 per-
cent of the realizations of the adjustment cost are below 35 per-
cent of the value of the old stock. 
Distribution, Redistribution, 
and Capital Accumulations 
Per Krusell and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull* 
Assistant Professors of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 
What is the role of the initial distribution of wealth in determin-
ing an economy's capital accumulation path? Posed in the con-
text of a standard neoclassical growth model where agents have 
identical, constant relative risk-aversion preferences and access 
to a complete set of asset markets, the answer is, None. In this 
paper, we consider the same setup, but assume that a political 
mechanism allows agents to tax for redistributive reasons. Our 
main goal is to make a quantitative assessment of this model's 
implications for how the wealth distribution affects the growth 
path. 
We use the one-sector growth model in its simplest form: 
the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas in capital 
and labor effort, and sustained growth is not feasible. The pop-
ulation consists of infinitely lived agents who are all identical 
except in their initial holdings of capital, and there are a finite 
number of types with respect to the initial wealth. Taxes have 
the form of a proportional income tax, the proceeds of which 
are rebated lump-sum. The policy determination process is one 
in which in each period there is a vote on the tax rate applied 
to current saving. The voter takes into account how the current 
policy affects the law of motion of the distribution of wealth 
and how it alters future policies. The equilibrium has the prop-
erty that the political preference of the median type coincides 
with the policy outcome. The model is calibrated to U.S. growth 
properties, and the politico-economic equilibrium is computed 
numerically. 
We find that redistribution of initial capital has surprisingly 
large effects on subsequent capital accumulation. Our estimates 
of the percentage change in long-run output following an initial 
redistribution of 1 percent of the total initial capital stock range 
between 1.3 and 21.7 percent, implying a great sensitivity of the 
capital accumulation path to the wealth distribution. For exam-
ple, an initial redistribution away from the median voter implies 
that the tax rate increases, and the economy starts on a path 
toward a new steady state with higher taxes and lower total cap-
ital (in total as well as for each type) than if there had been no 
redistribution. The key is that any redistribution affecting the 
potential net transfer of the median voter is quantitatively im-
portant in this agent's voting decision: if a higher tax rate im-
plies a higher net transfer, then in general the agent is likely to 
favor this higher tax even though it implies distortions. 
An important finding is that the time period over which the 
current tax rate is voted matters: long periods make the taxes re-
spond less to the changes in the initial distribution of capital. 
We interpret this finding as informative about institutions. Tax 
institutions where taxes are allowed to change (that is, are voted 
on) frequently lead to higher taxes on average and lower capital 
levels. 
A Quantitative Analysis of the Optimal Tax Structure 
Under Incomplete Markets 
Selahattin imrohoroglu 
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Southern California 
This paper investigates the optimal tax structure in an over-
lapping-generations model with lifetime uncertainty, idiosyn-
cratic income risk, and borrowing constraints. Taxing capital 
income is not desirable in this model because of the distortion 
on private saving and the consequent negative impact on the 
capital stock, aggregate output, and aggregate consumption. Tax-
ing labor income is also not desirable, despite the inelastic sup-
ply of labor, since an increase in the labor income tax would 
hinder the individuals' ability to self-insure and to provide for 
old-age consumption. Since the individuals are liquidity con-
strained, higher labor income taxes make it more likely that the 
constraints are binding. 
The model economy is calibrated to match certain features 
of aggregate U.S. data, and numerical methods are used to solve 
the individuals' finite-state, finite-horizon, discounted dynamic 
programs and to compute steady-state equilibria. The bench-
mark economy is one in which there is taxation of labor income 
(and unemployment insurance benefits) and capital income. The 
exogenous government purchases, which provide no utility to 
the individuals, and endogenously determined government trans-
fer payments are held constant in the face of tax reform. Dif-
ferent tax reforms are examined. First, the tax on capital income 
is eliminated, and the labor income tax is increased. Second, the 
same amount of government purchases and transfer payments 
is financed by gradually eliminating capital income taxation or 
labor income taxation and introducing a tax on consumption. 
The main finding is that moving away from capital income 
taxation toward labor income taxation yields a welfare benefit 
of 1 percent of aggregate consumption compared to the 6 per-
cent benefit that Lucas (1990b) finds. Replacing the capital in-
come tax with a higher tax rate on labor income redistributes re-
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sources away from the young working years during which bor-
rowing constraints are more likely to bind. Furthermore, when 
individuals have access to a private annuity market to insure 
against lifetime uncertainty, the optimal capital income tax is 10 
percent. Although eliminating this tax brings the economy clos-
er to the golden-rule steady-state capital stock, which maximizes 
aggregate consumption, the simultaneous increase in the labor 
income tax rate produces an equilibrium consumption profile 
that is further away from that chosen by the social planner. A 
lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption in-
creases the optimal capital income tax rate to 36 percent since 
the profile cost increases and the capital stock benefit decreases 
with a decline in the elasticity of substitution in consumption. 
When a consumption tax is made available, switching to con-
sumption taxation becomes optimal. This is very much in line 
with a wide body of findings in the optimal tax literature. The 
welfare benefits of implementing this optimal tax plan are on 
the order of 2-4 percent of aggregate consumption. At the same 
time, a consumption tax leads to a worsening of inequality of 
wealth as measured by the coefficient of variation. Under any 
tax base, the variability in consumption is small relative to that 
in wealth. 
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